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THE IMPACT OF REGIONAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES UPON
THE CULTURE OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING CANADIANS

by

Kenneth McNaught

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


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He has - They:
Thames

1. Wersch (Eng) - regl - scheme (Native) is subordinate to regional diversity.
2. Baptiste of E.C. Co.
3. Concern to survive - (as in other) (squared separately.)
4. Historic drive to west. shared by but a few (Eng) not shared with Natives.

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A. INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I THE PROBLEM DEFINED

I must moreover confess that I for one am deeply convinced of the impolicy of all such attempts (as restricting the use of the French language) to denationalize the French. Generally speaking they produce the opposite effect from that intended, causing the flame of national prejudice and animosity to burn more fiercely. But suppose them to be successful what would be the result? You may perhaps americanize, but, depend upon it, by methods of this description, you will never anglicize the French inhabitants of this province. Let them feel on the other hand that their religion, their habits, their prepossessions, their prejudices if you will, are more considered and respected here than in other portions of this vast continent which is being overrun by the most reckless, self-sufficient and dictatorial section of the Anglo-Saxon race, and who will venture to say that the last hand that waves the British flag on American ground may not be that of a French-Canadian?

- Lord Elgin to the British Colonial Secretary, 1847

1. Definition of "Culture"

The glittering yet liberal English aristocrat who is quoted above was right in implying that religion, habits, prepossessions and even prejudices are components of a people's culture. Lord Elgin was also perceptive in emphasizing the need to distinguish between Americanizing and Anglicizing - a need which has preoccupied both French and English-speaking Canadians in all the generations which have followed the

granting of responsible government. Indeed the very fact of Elgin's distinction between the cultures stresses an even more important problem of definition. By depicting the Americans as "the most reckless, self-sufficient and dictatorial section of the Anglo-Saxon race" he very clearly implied the effects of regional and ethnic impact upon an originating culture. Moreover, his plea to London on behalf of French Canadian cultural rights, in itself points to the effect of time and accumulated experience upon the assumptions made both by statesmen and the common people. The facts of change will be the most central theme of this study.

For our present purposes the term 'culture' will be taken to include the political and social assumptions and purposes produced by historic traditions, geographic environment, economic development, legal and political institutions, educational systems and philosophies, religion, and changes in ethnic patterns. Since, however, the studies of the present Royal Commission must all point eventually to political conclusions and political recommendations, the breadth of our definition of 'culture' will be limited always by the purpose of underlining the political implications of the subject.

2. Definition of "Region"

There is no general agreement amongst social scientists when it comes to delineating the regions of Canada. For geographers the problem is least perplexing but even for them the question of geographic impact on social growth and institutions

leads to differences of opinion - for example, do the major lines of geographic influence run north and south or east and west?

Are the principal Canadian geographic regions united by man's endeavours against the dictates of nature or is the country in fact a logical expression of interconnecting waterways, lines of climate and the rest?

While the debate on this question is inconclusive some Canadian regions are sufficiently clearly comprehended, especially when non-geographic factors are added to their definition, to permit reasonable discussion of their influence. For the present purpose the Canadian regions are: ^① the Atlantic provinces or ^② Maritimes; ^③ Quebec; ^④ Ontario; the ^⑤ Prairies; and British Columbia. A word is obviously necessary to defend this particular choice.

Although within each of the named regions one may easily distinguish subdivisions of more or less importance (e.g. traditionally isolated Newfoundland, the Ottawa valley, the foothills of the Rockies) it is reasonable to discuss the major regions as entities within which occasional subdivisions merit attention. Again, while the traditional geographic region of the St. Lawrence Lowlands is, by our present definition divided by a non-geographic line (or by political extension of the geographic line of the Ottawa River) the political divisions of Ontario and Quebec do also have a broadly geographic base - illustrated, for example, by ready access to the sea in the case of historic Quebec and by the climatic effect of the St. Lawrence River's northward thrust. And this brings us to a sixth region whose impact has been and

still is great, but which is purposely left undefined.

The "North" may not, at the moment, be particularly strong or even free, yet it still exercises a pull on the imaginations of the people as well as on the purse strings of investors. Historically, as well as at present, the North is more than one region, but its influence upon English-speaking Canadians has been increasingly in the direction of reasserting national as opposed to regional policies. In many respects the economic influence of the North has been a unifying influence. And for English-speaking Canadians the North has played an important conceptual role, particularly in shaping the battery of facts employed from time to time to illustrate the differentness of Canada in any comparison with the United States. For these reasons the North as a region is difficult to define and its geographic boundaries are less important than are those of the other regions. In one sense its influence has been against regionalism (with exceptions which will be noted) yet its impact has been varied in the different population regions. It will therefore have to be considered both as a factor of regional differentiation and as a factor contributing to an English-speaking Canadian culture.

3. Definition of "Ethnic"

Not so long ago it was acceptable usage to refer to racial differences in Canada, while back in 1907 it was possible for Andre Siegfried to entitle a discussion of Canadian politics The Race Question in Canada. Today it is more usual to employ

various synonyms such as "culture", "ethnic group", or even "nations" instead of "race". The usage depends upon the intended connotation and the context. An example of the resulting confusion is found in the terms of reference of the present Royal Commission. These refer to the two founding races although it requires a heroic distortion of anthropological definitions to consider the mixture of English, Scottish, Irish, Welsh, German and "American" people all of whom spoke English and were in British North America as "founders" long before 1867 and even before 1759, as an English "race". It is not much less a distortion to consider the mixture of Breton, Norman and other French-speaking peoples who were in the Canadian area at the same early periods a French "race". Conversely and ironically, the less precise term "ethnic group" is freely applied to more recently arrived sections of the population which are in fact more easily identifiable as "races" - e.g. the Italians, Ukrainians, Magyars, Portugese, Chinese etc.

One may conclude about this rather erratic usage that the various terms are considered to carry a didactic message, to incline the reader, or listener, towards a frame of mind which will be more receptive to the surrounding argument. Thus "race" is used most frequently by those who wish to emphasize and perpetuate or institutionalize sharp differences between sections of the population. It is a word particularly favoured by those who think of Canada as two "nations". For the same purpose of preparing a more favourable reception of the argument proponents of

the bi-racial thesis normally refer to the non-French-speaking, but European-descended portions of the population, as "ethnic groups" since this is a term of less fundamental differentiation and thus presents the newer arrivals as less of a basic modification of bi-racialism than might otherwise be the case. The quasi-propaganda content in such usage has to be noted and as far as possible excluded from the present discussion. It is worth observing at this point that English-speaking Canadians virtually never refer to themselves as a race (although such reference was quite customary at certain earlier stages) and that when they use the term "ethnic group" it usually implies recognition of a greater distinctiveness than when the same term is used by a French-Canadian nationaliste.

In any event the word "ethnic" in the present discussion, despite the above-noted vagaries of usage, will be employed as synonymous with "racial". The risks of confusing biological with linguistic and cultural factors will simply have to be accepted and the context relied upon for understanding. Otherwise a separate definition would be required on nearly every page. This generalized use of the term may well be justified, also, on the ground that nearly every term employed in the continuing discussion of divisive forces in Canada is subject to multiple interpretation. The exhaustive effort to make a clear distinction, for example, between French and English meanings of the word "nation" and its variations suggests the futility of seeking universally agreed definitions. The

exercise normally explodes in a bitter and additionally divisive war of words..

4. Method and Content

The underlying concept will not be that of the "equal partnership between the two founding races" since this is not only a controversial assumption but one which is most frequently challenged by the English-speaking Canadians and it is their cultural assumptions which constitute our subject. As the Preliminary Report of the present Royal Commission puts it, in the view of many English-speaking Canadians "to accept the premise of equal partnership would be tantamount to reaching conclusions before the inquiry was begun."⁽¹⁾

Our method, then, will be to examine the evolution of political ideas and purposes amongst English-speaking Canadians against the background of cultural changes. The extent to which shifts in ethnic patterns have affected such ideas will be a principal concern as will the influence of regions.

Whilst the focus must always be the present crisis of Confederation, the problem is essentially one of history. For history is as much a master for English-speaking Canadians as it is for French Canadians. No one can hope to understand the

1. Preliminary Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Ottawa, 1965), p.23

present culture and political ideas of English-speaking Canadians without comprehending past patterns of growth. Changes in the population make-up, in the role of regions, in attitudes towards social welfare, and in the nature of the Empire-Commonwealth, for example, provide the bulk of the explanation of a revolutionary change of attitude towards French Canadian aspirations which one can detect in some portions of the English-speaking population, as well as of a slower alteration of attitude in others.

Our most central theme, then, will be that of changing attitudes and a principal conclusion will emphasize the extreme dangers that adhere, on the one hand, in any reluctance to recognize change and, on the other, to force unduly the pace of change.

B. A NEW NATION?

...But the truth is you British Lower Canadians never can forget that you were once supreme - that Jean Baptiste was your hewer of wood and drawer of water. You struggle like the Protestant Irish in Ireland, like the Norman invaders in England not for equality but for ascendancy.... You can't admit the principle that the majority must governThe only remedies are immigration and copulation and these will work wonders. The laws are equally administered to the British as to the French - at least if we may judge by the names of your judges it might be so.... If a Lower Canadian Britisher desires to conquer he must "Stoop to conquer." He must make friends with the French - without sacrificing the status of his race or lineage he must respect their nationality. Treat them as a nation and they will act as a free people generally do - generously....

The only danger that threatens just now is the cry of Representation by Population..... The Peninsula must not get command of the ship. It is occupied by Yankees and Covenanters, in fact the most yeasty and unsafe of populations.

- John A. Macdonald to the editor of the Montreal Gazette, 1856.

...It was found that any proposition which involved the absorption of the individuality of Lower Canada - if I may use that expression - would not be received with favour by her people. We found, too, that though her people speak the same language and enjoy the same system of law as the people of Upper Canada, a system founded on the common law of England, there was as great a disinclination on the part of the various Maritime provinces to lose their individuality, as separate political organizations, as we observed in the case of Lower Canada herself..... If we do not take advantage of the time, if we show ourselves unequal to the occasion, it may never return, and we shall hereafter bitterly and unavailingly regret having failed to embrace the happy opportunity now offered of founding a great nation.....

- John A. Macdonald in the Confederation Debates, 1865.

CHAPTER II A GLANCE BEHIND THE GREAT DEBATE

1. Basic Character of the Five "Founding Regions"

The pragmatism of Sir John A. Macdonald achieved almost the level of ideology. Certainly few Canadians have been able to deal more effectively with ideologies, and the most casual glance at his remarks in the two quotations at the head of this section reveal his easy comprehension of the two nationalities which were of consequence in his day and which have remained significant to our own: a French-Canadian nationality based primarily on the instinct of racial survival and a new Canadian political nationality.

While the new political nationality of the 1860's was threatened at its birth by claims of racial autonomy emanating from Quebec, and by claims of racial predominance emanating from the "British" of Montreal and the majoritarian Grit population

of "Yankees and Covenanters" in the Ontario peninsula, it was conceived with a clear purpose of eliminating as many as possible of the claims of race. Such racial claims as were voiced or implied by English-speaking people were heavily influenced by regional location. Indeed, as Macdonald pointed out, such claims tended to be more regional than racial - as with "the various Maritime provinces" who feared for "their individuality as separate political organizations".

To a very substantial extent regional cultural loyalties affected the views taken by English-speaking Canadians of the political settlement of 1864-7. Since such loyalties were not only significant a hundred years ago but have by no means disappeared in our own day it is worth establishing the basic character of the five "founding regions".

2. The Maritimes

The keys to an understanding of the English-speaking culture of the Atlantic provinces are to be found in their diversity of economic activity, their integration in an Atlantic trading system, their geographic isolation from the continental interior and the absorptive capacity of their relatively long-established social and political institutions.

In 1861 the Maritime population of British North America was composed of Nova Scotia, 330,857; New Brunswick, 252,047; Prince Edward Island, 80,857; Newfoundland, 140,000. Partly because of leisurely population growth and partly because of

comparative prosperity the Maritimes succeeded in producing a fairly homogeneous culture. Pre-Loyalist and Loyalist mingled with Germans and Scots to form a basically English-speaking society in which deviations such as the tiny Acadian group and the Gaelic enclaves of Cape Breton could be viewed with the tolerance of satisfaction. It was a society in which the occasional newcomers quickly assumed the manners and attitudes of the older inhabitants. A society both bucolic and structured it already possessed strong cultural traditions. It was conscious of being an English colonial community of the sort that should have survived all along the Atlantic seaboard of America. Intensely proud of its possession of the common law and institutions of representative government (the Nova Scotia Assembly dates from 1758) Maritimers were equally aware of the importance of the sea to their way of life. Not only did they engage extensively in the great fisheries of the Grand Banks, the Gulf and the Bay of Fundy they had become important as merchant shippers and as builders of some of the fastest sailing ships on the Atlantic. It was in 1839 that Samuel Cunard, the leading merchant in Nova Scotia, won a mail contract for a regular steamship run to England.

Thrusting into the sea and away from the continent the Maritimes communities developed the loyalties which stem from isolation as well as those that stem from dependence. Using coastal sea routes they early developed an effective inter-community and inter-provincial communications system which did

much to foster a Maritime sense of identity. In Nova Scotia, which tended to be the hub of regional interest, geography further contributed to an integrated growth which was reflected in institutions and political attitudes. Geographic compactness, combined with the relative ease of communications, minimized the need of municipal government. Thus the legislatures were even more the focal points of Maritime life than was the case in the upper provinces. In Nova Scotia particularly, but also to a lesser extent in Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick a sense of community was strong. Newspapers could cover most of the populated regions of each province without difficulty and, since literacy was widespread, there was a common basis on which to discuss all things from the price of horses to political issues. Already the Maritimes had produced their own satirist in Thomas Chandler Haliburton and if the people described by Sam Slick were caricatures they were still sufficiently recognizable to give a comfortable feeling of identity to his constituency.

Nor was Haliburton, a Tory himself, inaccurate in sensing the basic conservatism of the region. Despite a certain boisterousness in the timber trade of the St. John Valley, a lively sense of commercial opportunity in the offices of Halifax, or even the vigour of the struggle for a free press and responsible government the character of life in the Maritimes was measured and orderly. This was at least partly due to the acquiescence, frequently proud and nearly always unstinting, in the imperial tie.

To a cynic Maritime devotion to the Empire may be explained in purely economic terms. From the day in 1749 when Halifax was founded as a counterpoise to Louisbourg the British had continued to spend large amounts of money in the region for supplies, salaries and the maintenance of dockyards and fortifications. In addition to the pecuniary interests of the "establishment" there were the memories of timber subsidies, protected markets in the West Indies and England, the continuing benefits of trading abroad under the British flag, and the very present need of imperial protection of the fisheries against American encroachments. But to explain imperial sentiment in the maritimes solely in terms of economic interest would be absurd. Homogeneity of customs and institutions together with a widespread conviction that both liberty and social justice stood a better chance of survival or achievement under the British institutions than under the uncouth republican democracy of the United States were clearly a part of Maritime imperial sentiment.

In the Maritime agitation for responsible government one can see a clear reflection of the bases of loyalty, of the pride of racial origin and of English-speaking culture. In the provincial debates and in the various exchanges between the Maritimers and the Colonial Office, no one spoke more certainly for the great majority in the Atlantic provinces than did Joseph Howe and it is worth quoting from one of his letters to Lord John Russell:

A commoner feels, in England, not as commoners used to feel in France, that honours and influence are only to be obtained by an utter prostration of spirit, the foulest adulation, the most utter subserviency to boundless prerogatives, arbitrarily exercised, - but, that they are to be won in open arenas, by the exercise of those manly qualities which command respect; and by the exhibition of the ripened fruits of assiduous intellectual cultivation, in the presence of an admiring nation whose decision ensures success. Hence there is a self-poised and vigorous independence in the Briton's character by which he strangely contrasts with all his European neighbours. His descendants in the colonies, notwithstanding the difficulties of their position, still bear to John Bull, in this respect, a strong resemblance; but it must fade if the system be not changed; and our children, instead of exhibiting the bold front and manly bearing of the Briton, must be stamped with the lineaments of low cunning and sneaking servility, which the practical operation of colonial government has a direct tendency to engender....

If the Frenchmen in one province do not understand, or cannot be entrusted with this valuable privilege, why should we, who are all British or of British descent, be deprived of what we do understand and feel that we can never be prosperous and happy without?

Howe's point was won. To Maritimers the responsible government that followed Lord Grey's despatch of 1846 conveyed precisely what Howe had demanded: the privileges of Englishmen. If, at the same time, the Maritimes entered its golden age of "wood, wind, and water", it is not to be wondered that their sense of regional identity should be invigorated, their belief in the imperial connection strengthened, and even that their conviction that English-speaking culture was both superior to other cultures and that it had a strong racial component should be nourished.

3. The English-speaking Lower Canadians

In 1861 the population of Lower Canada (Canada East) was 1,111,566 of which about 80 percent was of French descent. While fifty percent of the people in the economically dominant city of Montreal were of British origin there is every evidence of their intense concern about their minority position within the province as a whole. In some respects the "British-Canadians" of Lower Canada behaved like the Anglo-Irish of the Ascendancy and certainly many of them experienced feelings of racial superiority. Most of them lived apart from French Canadian society and maintained their own schools, university and clubs. But in some important respects English-speaking Lower Canadians were in no way comparable to the English aristocracy of Ireland.

Most important amongst the differences is that the Anglo-Irish did not think in terms of ultimate assimilation of the Irish. Certainly anglicization of the French Canadians had been a long-established goal of English-speaking Quebeckers. Their passionate endeavours to hold Murray and Carleton to the presumed purposes of 1763, their long struggle to undo the Quebec Act, their sharp disappointment with the political division imposed in 1791 and the opportunities given by the Constitutional Act for the growth of French Canadian nationalism, their long campaign for a union of the Canadas and the joy with which they greeted Durham's appreciation of their commercial goals - all these assert the convictions of racial dominance. When union was

achieved, and Howe's "Frenchmen in one province" showed not only a competence to operate the machinery of responsible government but an unnerving capacity to retrieve most of the cultural benefits of separation within the union (virtually separate budgets, dual ministerial leadership, restoration of French as a language of the legislature etc.), the English-speaking Quebeckers displayed a predictable schizophrenia in their politics.

But it is precisely at this point that one encounters factors at work other than those of racial confidence. Unlike the Anglo-Irish, the British of Lower Canada were completely committed to a way of life based upon commerce. While a considerable number of Loyalists had taken up land in the Eastern Townships and developed a subordinate agrarian-merchant capital at Sherbrooke it was perfectly clear by the 1860's that the Eastern Townships were never going to provide the British population of Montreal with the kind of broad farming hinterland of English-speaking yeomen such as George Brown found so encouraging in the Ontario peninsula. The real economic interest taken in the Townships by the English-speaking Quebeckers was that of the land speculator and the railway promoter. Mercantile entrepreneurs such as A.T. Galt did not miss the significance of the fact that most of the land of the British American Land Company was being taken up by French Canadians and that the proportion of English-speaking farmers in the townships was steadily declining. Increasingly the English-speaking interest in the Townships shifted from the

development of agriculture to the enhancement of land values. As early as 1849 the authors of the Annexation Manifesto made the point when they claimed hopefully that American union would "equalize the value of real estate upon both sides of the boundary, thereby probably doubling at once the entire present value of property in Canada..."

Yet to jump from the obvious commercial culture of the English-speaking Lower Canadians to the conclusion that such cultural orientation is to be explained principally in terms of race and/or religion is at best a dubious sequence - although it is a causal argument which appears either explicitly or implicitly in a great deal of Canadian historical writing. Today the causal role of the "protestant ethic" is treated with some circumspection. It is increasingly clear that the "capitalist ethic" made Protestants rather than that the "protestant ethic" made capitalists. Amongst the Anglo-Quebeckers, assertions of racial and religious rights were the means of defending or extending economic positions and social status. And the economic positions and ambitions were conditioned decisively by the nature of the region and by the region's relationship to the rest of the continent. It is perfectly clear that the original English-speaking people of Quebec, filtering north in the wake of British military success, came with visions of commercial opportunity. They brought with them no dream of extending Protestantism in North America. Still less were they moved by a

strong urge to extend Anglo-Saxon dominion per se. Moving into Quebec they found themselves able to fill a gap left by the withdrawal of French merchant capital and as they took over the ancient fur trade organization they assumed also the ambitions to exploit the trade and transportation possibilities of the continental hinterland that had characterized much also of the history of New France.

It is abundantly evident that the existing conditions and the potential of the region exercised a definitive influence upon the Anglo-Quebeckers. As their original numbers were reinforced by subsequent Loyalist migration and again by migration from the British Isles the patterns of opportunity were clearly understood and accepted by the newer arrivals - as, too, were the discernible obstacles to fulfillment of those patterns. It was not a cultural difference from the French majority that dictated social segregation in Lower Canada. Under the old French regime it had been just as possible for "exploitive capitalists" to arise and to benefit from their social-political influence as it was for Anglo-Quebeckers to repeat the process after 1759. There was little cultural difference between a LaSalle, a Rigaud, or a Lotbinière and a McGill, a McTavish or a Molson - and, indeed recent research suggests clearly enough that the mercantile capitalists who controlled the economic life of New France were no less materialistic and no less successful than were their counterparts in the Thirteen Colonies whence the first Anglo-Quebeckers came. Indeed, compared

to the New England colonies, and New York, New France was highly successful in economic terms.⁽¹⁾ Nor can much of a case be made for the proposition that the cultural separateness of the Anglo-Quebeckers was a result of natural racial antipathy. Genial relations in the conduct of the fur trade and a quite astonishing spate of inter-marriage are two prominent arguments, amongst many, that cultural antipathies within Lower Canada are not to be traced to narrowly racial feelings.

1. See, e.g. G. Frégault, La Société canadienne sous le Régime français (Ottawa, 1956) and Cameron Nish, "Une bourgeoisie coloniale en Nouvelle-France in L'Actualité Economique, vol. 39, no. 2, 1963. While a lively debate continues to flourish between those who advance a "bourgeoisie hypothesis" (such as G. Frégault, M. Brunet and C. Nish) and those who insist that there never was a real bourgeoisie in New France (such as F. Cueleste, Jean Hamelin and W. J. Eccles) much of the argument concerns definitions. It appears to me that there is now persuasive evidence to show that the quasi-mercantilistic integration of political, social, merchant and landed interests in single individuals was not much different in New France from the similar cases in New England, New York and Virginia. Without necessarily going to the extent of accepting the nationalist interpretation that sometimes accompanies the "bourgeoisie hypothesis," it is possible to agree that the decapitation of the mercantile interest at the time of 'the conquest' made it much easier for the English-speaking immigrants to take over the Montreal-based economy.

Beyond doubt the Anglo-Quebeckers developed arguments based upon the superiority of English-speaking culture and, particularly, English law and constitutionalism, and such arguments took on an emotional content which was reinforced by the cumulative effect of social separateness. Apparent 'racialism' was reinforced also by the growth of French-Canadian nationalism and the minority fears attendant upon that growth. But this brings one back to the essential factor of the commercial basis of English-speaking society in Lower Canada. And again, the key to this is easily enough found in both the actions and the letters of the chief representatives of that society.

As imperial support for its political and economic position evaporated in the series of jolts occasioned by the removal of preferential tariffs and the granting of responsible government the Anglo-Quebeckers gyrated wildly in their response. But one theme remained constant and may be illustrated by the brief quotation from a letter written by A. T. Galt in April, 1849.⁽²⁾ Reporting to his overseas superiors in the British American Land Company that he was being pressed to offer himself in a

2. O.D.Skelton, Life and Times of Alexander Tilloch Galt (Toronto, 1920), pp. 141-3

by-election as successor to Samuel Brooks, who had died while representing Sherbrooke County, Galt advised the company's Court to authorize his candidacy. His letter reveals precisely the close-knit structure of the Lower Canadian English-speaking power elite and its identification of social well-being with commercial prosperity. Reporting that he had "waited upon Mr. McGill and Mr. Moffatt" and that they had "concurred in my opinion that my presence in the House would promote the Company's interest" Galt undertook to explain his position further.

I need not remind the Court that the principle upon which the government of this province is now conducted has placed all power in the hands of the leaders of the House of Assembly, and that in fact no appeal exists to any other adequate tribunal. The British government would, I am sure, decline interfering to protect the Company in the event of any local measure pressing with undue severity upon them. To the Executive government of the day, therefore, the Company must be prepared to address their remonstrances and petitions.

Galt pointed out that his exertions in promoting a railroad in the Townships as well as other proposals which would benefit the Company had frequently met with the retort: "Why do not your representatives take up the matter if it is so important?" Concluding that he must stand, Galt remarked that "I consider the interests of the Company and of the country to be identical... my views are all for objects of material advantage."

Despite a personal coolness to the idea, Galt joined with the other Anglo-Quebec leaders in supporting the Annexation Manifesto. While he had no bitterness on racial or political grounds following the passage of the Rebellion Losses Bill

"What's good for General Oakes, ... etc" →

Galt believed firmly that the prosperity of the Company and the region depended upon replacing the lost imperial preference with complete American reciprocity based, of necessity, upon political union. And when Lord Elgin's influence with the Colonial Office led to the successful negotiation of a Reciprocity Treaty with the United States, Galt went along with the other Anglo-Quebeckers in taking this "second best" solution. Indeed, in 1854, the very year in which the Reciprocity Treaty was signed, the English-speaking Montrealers found in the emergent Liberal-Conservative party managed by John A. Macdonald and Georges Étienne Cartier the means of coming to terms with the combined threat of responsible government and their minority position. If constitutional Reformers in Lower Canada could combine with liberal Reformers in Upper Canada to force responsible government, then the Anglo-Quebeckers could combine with French Canadian conservatives and Upper Canadian Tories to operate the system and retrieve at least some of the benefits lost through changes in the imperial system.

For our purposes the significance of these familiar historical passages lies in the evidence which they provide that, where political accommodation was possible, racial antipathies as such were no barrier to effective co-operation. At each point since 1759 the hostility of the Anglo-Quebeckers towards "the French", whether expressed in terms of anglicization or in terms of the 1837 loyalty question, was the result of the commercial basis of English-speaking Quebec culture. When French Canadian support

for canals, railways and other 'internal improvements' could be had in return for abandoning the pressures for anglicization (in return for operating Union as a federation through the wavering principle of double majorities) the racial issue was stilled. And this is the more remarkable since the 1840's were, in many respects, the birth-time of modern French Canadian nationalism - in the writing of François Xavier Garneau and nationalist poets such as Louis Fréchette.

As the trade based upon the St. Lawrence and its Upper Canadian hinterland began to recover in the 1850's, and as the railway boom expanded, the economic potential of the region reasserted its influence upon the cultural-political attitudes of the Anglo-Quebeckers. As in the days before their exclusion from the fur trade they began to think in terms of economic integration not only of the St. Lawrence lands but also of the lost country beyond the Great Lakes. The fact that many French Canadians, for whom Cartier as Grand Trunk solicitor was the representative figure, saw the possibility of sharing in the benefits of commercialism adds to the weight which must be attached to the impact of regional differences upon cultural attitudes. In 1854 the resignation from the ministry of Louis H. La Fontaine was, to a considerable extent, because he disapproved of the spreading infection of commercialism. Inability to carry on the experiment of Union for more than another ten years was the result not of the racial exclusiveness of the Anglo-Quebeckers, but rather, of a mixture of racial-religious prejudice (or conviction) and economic interest on the part of the English-speaking majority in Upper Canada.

4. From the Ottawa to the Detroit

By 1861 the population of Upper Canada had already outnumbered that of Lower Canada for more than ten years, and stood at 1,396,091. The numerical facts are important not only because the Preliminary Report of the present Royal Commission notes a tendency to play the "numbers game" in discussions during the present crisis, but because the question of numbers and the basis of representation dominated much of the politics of the 1850's and 1860's. The attitudes taken to these questions also reflected the social-economic condition and ambitions of the Upper Canadian region.

The cultural attitudes of the majority of Upper Canadians were expressed definitively in the political slogan "Rep. by Pop". But just as with the Anglo-Quebeckers and the Maritimers, feelings of racial superiority or antipathy sprang at least as much from the characteristics and opportunities (or frustrations) of the region as from cultural differences. True, the Orange Order brought into the region fundamental hatreds and suspicions of Popery (especially French Popery), and throughout much of the Ontario peninsula there existed a strongly Protestant mistrust of the priestly "domination" of Lower Canadian society. Yet it is possible to lay too great stress on the racial-religious basis of the Toronto Globe's heated anti-French Jeremiads.

However one describes the majority culture of Upper Canada in the 1850's and 1860's there is little doubt that the Globe was its principal literary expression. As the organ of the Clear Grits it spoke for the farmers and small merchants from about

Port Hope to Sarnia. Its constituents were either immigrants from the British Isles, the descendants of Loyalists or of post-Loyalist immigration from the United States. Many of them had sympathized with William Lyon Mackenzie in '37 and most entertained political ideas that owed much to Jacksonian democracy and to British Chartism. In religious affairs the word "voluntaryism" was often on their lips while in political matters the notion of direct democracy through the broadening of the franchise, lowering or abolition of property qualifications for office-holding, and the increase in the number of elective offices was dominant.

It is necessary to emphasize these aspects of the agrarian democracy of Upper Canada for its anti-French sentiments were as much an expression of political-economic concern as of religious fears. The long struggle over secularization of the Clergy Reserves was a symbol both of Upper Canadian Protestant proclivities and of the political-economic desire to hasten the development of the country and eliminate legally-based privilege. The gradual Clear Grit acceptance of British as opposed to American constitutional forms in no way abated agrarian-small merchant suspicion of those who upheld the Compact traditions. Nor did it check a rising apprehension that interrelations between the new railways and Conservative businessmen-politicians posed a threat to agrarian welfare. As it became clear that the railway promoters could bargain successfully with a solid Lower Canadian bloc and obtain, in return for

such legislation as that which established a separate school system in Canada West, support for railway guarantees and an incipient protective tariff, the Clear Grits began automatically to think in terms of numbers. Realizing that they constituted a majority in the western part of the province and that their potential political allies, the Rouges, were a shaky and diminishing minority in Canada East, the Grits seized with growing enthusiasm upon the demand for representation by population. They looked with favour upon any political devices that would encourage reluctant moderates to join their ranks - and prominent amongst such devices were the various cries of French domination. In such campaigns escalation is as predictable as logic is scarce, and Grit meetings were galvanized by remarks such as that attributed by Lord Elgin to John Henry Boulton: "the negroes are the great difficulty of the States and the French Canadians of Canada."

Strengthening the significance of the regional impact upon Upper Canadian attitudes was the pattern of political geography within the region itself. Roughly speaking, the further east one went the less secure was the Grit position. While the Ottawa valley was the home of much deep Orange sentiment and the shoreline from Port Hope through Prescott was scarcely a model of religious toleration, this eastern section gave strong support to the Conservatives whose other main source of strength was the French Canadian majority. It was this section that was

most willing to endorse what seemed necessary for the prosperity of the timber trade, the forwarding houses of Kingston and the canal-lake shipping firms of the St. Lawrence system. Conversely, the farmers of the peninsula saw little merit in tariff charges designed to protect and develop the St. Lawrence system or to build an east-west Grand Trunk railway. They cherished the cheap outlet offered by the Erie Canal and by the spreading rail network south of the Lakes. There is little reason to doubt that, while the dominant tone of English-speaking culture in Canada West was that of Protestantism set in a basically frontier agrarian environment, the political expression of that culture was materially shaped by the changing circumstances of the region.

Since it is very relevant to present discussions of cultural differences in Canada it is also worth noting that the alleged individualism of Frederick Jackson Turner's American frontier was not a particularly noticeable feature of Upper Canadian culture. Not only has recent historical research emphasized the extent of metropolitan dominance in Canadian economic growth (and in attendant cultural assumptions)⁽³⁾ it is perfectly clear that the

3. See, e.g., J. M. S. Careless, "Frontierism, Metropolitanism and Canadian History" in *Canadian Historical Review*, March, 1954.

uses of collective action were not strange to the Upper Canadians. While some objected to governmental subsidization of certain kinds of internal improvement, very few objected to such use of government on principle. And, indeed that which most surely united Upper Canadians was the broadening concept of public education, and here one must conclude that by the 1860's this "culture" saw itself as a "collectivity" at least to the same extent as did Nova Scotians or the French Canadians. Current endeavours to read back into this area of English-speaking culture a greater individualism than could be found amongst French Canadians seem entirely unwarranted. As Egerton Ryerson reported in 1853:

The withdrawal of a few persons here and there from the support of the Public Schools, will scarcely be felt by the people at large, -- even in a pecuniary sense, - while a disadvantage will be with the separatists; and the supporters of the Public Schools in such localities will have the advantage of promoting the interest of General Education, free from the impediments of internal discord and opposition.(4)

The use of anti-French and anti-Catholic political war cries tended to strengthen a sense of identity in Canada West - a sectional awareness which, paradoxically, worked together with

4. C. B. Sissons, Egerton Ryerson, His Life and Letters (Toronto, 1947), Vol. II, p. 237.

the growing disparity in numbers between Canada West and Canada East, to permit Brown to take the Grits into the coalition government of 1864.

In a very real sense the sectional animosities of United Canada - animosities which so frequently wore the garb of racial and religious bigotry - were the product of differing economic situations. As the developing commercial and agricultural hinterland of Toronto enhanced the city's economic strength and ambitions the plans of this second Canadian metropolis came into prominence. If the political base of the Clear Grits was agrarian the interests of a number of Grit leaders were strongly commercial. It was no accident that George Brown was amongst the first propagandists of prairie expansion. More and more the regional context influenced the political attitudes of the Upper Canadians and when "political deadlock" was reached within the Union, the basis of that conflict lay in regional ambitions, the growing commerce of Canada West, and dislike of Montreal's dominance, as much as it lay in the artificially heated racial conflict. Were this not the case it is extremely unlikely that even the interrelated threats of American Civil War and imperial separatism could have induced Canada West to give up the drive for "rep. by pop." within the Union and instead, to enter negotiations for a broader federation.

5. The West and the North

Although the scene of various defeats in the past, and despite a miniscule population, the prairie Northwest and the Far West contained a heavy investment by Canadians. For French Canadians the early history of the western fur trade had become an integral part of the romantic nationalist movement in Lower Canada while the Métis of the Red River settlement represented a mounting French Canadian hope that the survival area of French and Catholic civilization in North America would not be that alone of the Laurentian region. For the Anglo-Quebeckers, the traumatic experience of 1821 when the absorption of the North-West Company by the Hudson's Bay Company extinguished effective Montreal interest in the West had been succeeded by a slow revival of such interest - based not upon furs but upon transportation and settlement. The two cultures inside Lower Canada were thus prepared to continue moderate political co-operation not only for the purposes noted above but also, increasingly, for the advancement of their respective interests in the West.

At the same time the agrarian-commercial interest of Upper Canada came awake to western possibilities. And the impact of ethnic and regional differences became exceedingly complex. Unquestionably the nearly total occupation of easily available arable land in Canada West provided the principal political appeal of the prairies in the eyes of Grit farmers. The columns of the Globe in the late '50's and '60's carried increasingly frequent

and glowing accounts of the West. Millions of acres of rich soil lay there waiting for the sons of the Ontario strand. In a very real sense the conditions of both regions - the occupied farmlands of Upper Canada and the beckoning reaches of the prairie West - were converting a relatively settled agrarian population into a restless people with a somewhat anxious eye on the future.

Two further factors intensified Upper Canada's concern with the western region. One was the growing dissatisfaction with the constitutional arrangements inside the Union of Canada East and Canada West whereby the legislative representation of each section was equal despite the growing population disparity in favour of Canada West. The fear that votes from Canada East would somehow circumscribe the conditions of "future relations between Upper Canada and the Prairies was added to the other sources of friction inside the Canadian Union. Just as French Canadians looked upon the land of the Eastern Townships as belonging to them through historic right, so the Upper Canadian farmers conceived a proprietary attitude towards the Prairies, and their interest was not slackened by the hope that an influx of Canadian and British migrants would make irresistible their demand for a revision of the Canadian scheme of legislative representation.

The second catalyst at work in this situation was the growing commercialization of Upper Canadian culture. While the great voting strength of the Grits was supplied mainly by the peninsular farmers the party's leadership was heavily infused with professional

and commercial men. George Brown was a journalist whose connection with farming was political, and subsidiary both to his profession and his bourgeois cast of mind. William Macdougall was a lawyer and a journalist. Alexander Mackenzie was a builder and contractor with an interest in journalism. John Sandfield Macdonald was a lawyer and Malcolm Cameron was a merchant printer. All of these men, and most of the other Grit leaders, possessed mercantile interests and, more importantly, thought in the terms of mid-Victorian economic liberalism.

The concern of these men with agriculture was basically a concern with export surpluses and markets and with farmers as the users of merchant services. In some respects it is fair to say that they were engaged in an early 'status revolution' by which they would once and for all eliminate Tory-Compact pretension, Montreal domination, and French Canadian-supported restriction of their optimistic commercial expansionism. Thus they viewed Galt's tariffs askance, propounded the doctrines of free trade, and looked with growing enthusiasm to the West. With their small but growing stores of capital they would invest in Western land, transportation facilities and commercial establishments. Toronto, and not Montreal, would become the key metropolis of vastly expanded Upper Canada. In time the nascent factories of Toronto, Brantford, Hamilton and other burgeoning towns of the region would engross a huge western market and the region would become relatively independent of the economic controls of the St. Lawrence system.

In the whole of the 'Northwest Territories' (i.e. everything from the boundaries of Upper Canada to the Arctic and the Rockies) there was, in 1861, a settled population of 6,691. Even this figure is misleading, for many of the inhabitants treated farming as a secondary occupation and spent most of their time in hunting or in services subsidiary to the Hudson's Bay Company operations. The Company itself 'owned' Rupert's Land, drained by rivers flowing to Hudson Bay, and enjoyed a trade monopoly with virtual governmental authority over all the rest of the territory.

Yet while the population was tiny and its relationship to external authority imprecise it had developed a communal centre and an incipient sense of identity. Fort Garry, on the present site of Winnipeg, was the hub of settlement. Its population of slightly more than 5,000 was composed of Métis, of both Scottish and French descent, scattered English speaking farmers (mostly ex-servants either of North-West Company or of the Hudson's Bay Company and descendents of the Selkirk settlers), a handful of Americans from St. Paul and a small group of very active Canadians. Within this context the impact both of race and region was violent - directly, upon the Métis and indirectly upon the others. It was an augury of things to come in the future Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta.

A large part of the Red River population depended upon the buffalo hunt, and some were developing agriculture beyond the subsistence point. Most had an interest in the slowly growing trade south to Minnesota and, insofar as this was tolerated by the Company

(a nearly complete tolerance after 1849) the end of the Bay's monopoly and rights of government were foretold. Yet while the semi-military organization of the Métis buffalo hunt was a major reason for the decline of Company authority and was also a main cause of the sense of differentness upon which all observers have remarked, other factors also affected the attitudes of the Red River people. Realization of the extent of their isolation was the most significant. Since 1821 there had been no direct connection with Canada and the route to St. Paul by boat and trail was over five hundred miles in length. Isolation, and the virtual disappearance of the amphibious fur trade route across the Shield to the Lakes and St. Lawrence valley, meant that few of the westerners felt like Canadians, fewer felt like Americans, and even the presence of French Canadian priests and Anglican and Methodist missionaries did little to establish ties to the East. Isolation, moreover and the absence of mass immigration, steadily increased the proportion of the community that was of mixed blood and thus heightened the sense of identity. As a son of the region wrote in 1861:

...it is an interesting fact that the half castes or mixed race, not only far outnumber all the other races in the colony put together, but engross nearly all the more important and intellectual offices - furnishing from their number the sheriff, medical officer, the post-master, all the teachers but one, a fair proportion of the magistrates and one of the electors and proprietors of the only newspaper in the Hudson's Bay territories. (5)

5. A. K. Isbister, "The Hudson's Bay Territories", Nor'Wester, Aug. 15, 1861. Quoted in W. L. Morton, Manitoba, a History (Toronto, 1957) p.91.

Clearly regional influences were dominant in shaping the little "nation" of the Red River. It seems equally evident that English-speaking culture in this pre-Canadian area was sharply modified by those same influences. Suspicion of controls (both actual and incipient) from outside was matched by a cautious confidence in the development of the community itself. Moreover, a lack of race-consciousness was more the rule than the exception amongst even the leading citizens. The statement in a letter written by one of them in 1856 suggests not only the racial tolerance but almost a pride in the common racial bond that provided an entente between French- and English-speaking compatriots: "What if mama were an Indian?"(6)

Yet regionalism was also to play a prominent role in disrupting this promising cultural evolution. On two sides interested fingers were reaching toward the northern prairies while authority from the North was weakening. American interest in the nearly unoccupied lands was increasing, and Canadians were not slow to recognize that the seventeenth century monopoly charter of the Hudson's Bay Company was as unlikely to survive the pressures of North American expansion in the nineteenth century as was the South's peculiar institution of slavery. In the 1850's Grit

6. James Ross to his sisters, Dec. 24, 1856. Public Archives of Manitoba. Quoted in Morton, Manitoba, p.91.

papers like the Globe and the North American openly campaigned for the annexation of the whole West to Canada, while into the Red River valley trickled a little stream of Upper Canadians - unofficial advance agents of a rising agrarian-commercial ambition. The so-called "Canadian party" of merchants, journalists and speculators brought with them the claims of a nascent Canadian nationalism unhappily mixed with unabashed profit-seeking which at once laid the base for an enduring, if complicated and changing friction.

While the Hudson's Bay Company was one of the outside authorities resisted by the Red River community and was equally an impediment to the manifest destiny of George Brown (not to mention that of the Grand Trunk Railway) it was an extraordinarily important guarantor of the Canadian future. It remained a pre-eminent symbol of the Canadian continuity. Had it not been for the quasi-legal extension of governmental authority over those regions beyond Rupert's Land, in which the Company enjoyed a trade monopoly rather than full charter authority, there seems little doubt that both the Prairies and the West Coast would have gone the way of Oregon - would have succumbed before the claims of that other manifest destiny thrusting up from the south.

While this is important in terms of general history, it is still more important in terms of the way in which English-speaking Canadians thought about the North and the West. More than ready to assert the ancient St. Lawrence ambition, reinforced by the newer aspirations of the Ontario peninsula, they recognized that

the practicability of their hopes rested upon the continuity of British control across the whole region of the Northwest to the Pacific. Eagerly prepared to relieve London of the responsibilities which were involved (as well as of the profits), the Canadians responded quickly to the invitation to present their views before the British select committee which was appointed in 1857 to investigate the whole question. And the Grits were as enthusiastic about the mission as were the Anglo-Quebeckers. But the essence of this case, and certainly this was well-understood within the contemporary popular culture, was that Canada would become the legatee of a British West.

English-speaking Canadians, in the 1850's and 1860's, had differing views on which of the two sections of Canada would exercise a dominant influence in the West. They did not doubt, however, that the predominant character of the West would be that of a culture subordinate to the Eastern population centre. It would be a culture, too, based upon a British rather than an American concept of law and order, and within which the English language would spread automatically. The exact relationships between farming, commerce, transportation and the development of other natural resources was something that could be left for the future to settle. But that the North and the West should be "saved" for Canada was a point of agreement so important that it became a principal factor in the resolution of the Canadian political deadlock of 1864.

Curiously, the very claims made by the Bay (whether for continuing control or for a high selling price) reinforced a British colouration in the English-speaking Canadians' concept of the Northwest. The Company had been the first European authority in the whole region and, despite both French and English-speaking Canadian endeavours in the Northwest, it had held its ground... even if only in trust for Canadians. By the late 1860's English-speaking Canadians could applaud the decisive defensive activity of James Douglas on the Pacific coast. For there the Company and the Crown seemed to be co-operating in exactly the experimental manner best suited to the cultural pre-suppositions and the commercial ambitions of the English-speaking Canadians.

British creation of the colony of Vancouver Island in 1849 was clearly intended to forestall the loss of "northern Oregon" by default to the settlement drive of the Americans. But the growing sway of Little Englandism meant that the Company rather than the British government would be, until 1858, the real custodian. When the Cariboo gold strike of 1856 enticed prospectors north from the fading bonanza of California (as well as the ever-restless settlers of Washington and Oregon territories) Douglas simply proclaimed his authority over the mainland. "My authority for issuing that proclamation," wrote Douglas in 1857,

seeing that it refers to certain districts of continental America, which are not strictly speaking, within the jurisdiction of this Government may perhaps, be called in question; but I trust that the motives which have influenced me on this occasion and the fact of my being invested with the authority over the premises of the Hudson's Bay Company, and the only

authority commissioned by Her Majesty within reach, will plead my excuse. Moreover, should Her Majesty's Government not deem it advisable to enforce the rights of the Crown, as set forth in the proclamation, it may be allowed to fall to the ground and to become a mere dead letter.

The authority, of course, did not fall to the ground. In 1858 the colony of British Columbia was established ("British", as the Queen put it, because "the citizens of the United States call their country also Columbia, at least in poetry"). Transition from merely Company, to full royal government was symbolized when the ex-chief factor, Douglas, became the colony's first governor. For the cultural attitudes of English-speaking Canadians this sequence of events could scarcely be more significant. Once again, on the Pacific, the English common law, the continuing link with Great Britain, the concept of "established" order, use of the army and the government to plan and carry out "internal improvements" were the experience. As had happened earlier in the Atlantic region and in Upper Canada the "system" served to modify the impact of regional isolation. The exercise of authority was perhaps even more important in British Columbia than was the case in Upper Canada when the westward surge of American settlers washed across the Ontario peninsula - because coastal isolation rendered American proximity more tempting.

Establishment of courts, police and government prior to, or coincident with, settlement sharply conditioned the way in which English-speaking Canadians have adapted themselves to the various regions they occupied. The experience of early reliance upon government for the establishment of cultural patterns (and not of

"compact" or self-constituted government) not only distinguished Canadian from American at the time, it made them much less reluctant to employ governmental power as an instrument for the attainment of collective goals in their post-colonial period. The enduring habits of mind which were established may be suggested by the fact that it was under Canada's first Grit prime minister, Alexander Mackenzie, that the Royal North-West Mounted Police were established in 1873 for the specific purpose of ensuring a "non-American" type of development in the Prairie West.

In 1861 British Columbia's population was slightly more than 50,000. Of all the regions of British North America its culture was the most influenced by the United States. Yet it was also, and largely because of the influence of the American mining frontier, an example of the countervailing force of a consciously imposed political-cultural pattern within a context where regional 'separatism' was almost indigenous and the pulls of a neighbouring region were strong.

Throughout English-speaking Canada, but not including the Maritimes, the whole Northwest had begun to appear as a solution to the regional problems - both economic and ethnic - of United Canada. Those aspects of the Northwest which have been discussed in the preceding paragraphs strengthened the 'British' feeling of English-speaking Canadians. While a racial modus vivendi, which at times went beyond the transitory, existed in Canada proper,

the nature and the opportunities of the Northwest were to tempt English-speaking Canadians to the unwise conclusion that English-speaking culture could become clearly dominant across British North America.

English-speaking Canadian Nationalism

i. "La Survivance" as an English-speaking Canadian Goal

The foundation period of the Canadian political state has been examined from many points of view and with a great variety of purpose. The pressures which led to Confederation, the processes of conciliation, compromise and guarantee, the role of leadership, and the extension of the party system have all been carefully delineated. Historians are all but unanimous in discerning "la survivance" as the goal towards which French Canadians strove tirelessly. "La survivance" led Cartier to anticipate a French future on the Prairies just as fear of non-survival led many of his fellow Lower Canadians to oppose the confederal scheme altogether. But when the motives of the English-speaking Canadians are considered one encounters no such apparent unity of purpose.

In the latter case historians point to the conflict of economic interests, to vacillation between the choices of annexation to the United States, colonial subservience to the British Empire, and independence. They quote often the cry of some Grits that Confederation was just another haul at the public purse by the Grand Trunk Railway, and they depict with gusto the machinations of the International Financial Society and the competing transportation capitalists of Toronto and Montreal. The picture that emerges of English-speaking culture from the 1860's to the 1890's is of a society so dominated by its various economic concerns as to be almost totally without conviction about its future.

If such an interpretation were applied to the neo-mercantilism of Alexander Hamilton or to the agrarian expansionism of Thomas Jefferson and the conclusion drawn that neither was basically concerned about the "survival" of his culture it would not stand scrutiny. The comparison is exaggerated. Yet while we have our historical revisionists, such as D. G. Creighton, W. L. Morton or P. B. Waite, the central role played by the concept of survival has been usually depreciated in the historiography of English-speaking Canada. For this there are many reasons, but several suggest themselves with particular force. The most obvious is that English-speaking Canada felt the impact of regional differences far more profoundly than did French Canada. The manner in which regional differences affected the different sections of English-speaking Canada prior to Confederation has already been suggested and in a moment the extension of these effects in the early federal period will be noticed. Here it is sufficient to observe that the various definitions of, and prescriptions for survival of "English-speaking Canadian culture" (reflecting differing regional conditions and ambitions and different degrees of ethnic awareness or emphasis) have obscured the fact that survival per se was at least as important in the thinking of English-speaking Canadians as it was in that of French Canadians.

A further reason for imbalance in the treatment of the central motive of survival has also been hinted at in the preceding pages. It is the obvious preoccupation of English-speaking Canadians with economic growth. This has led to the too easy assumption that they were only interested in economics - that because of this they were constantly open to the temptations of annexation to the United States.

There are two aspects of this position. The first is the implied comparison with French Canada in which cultivation of the myth and the fact of a relatively unchanging farm-based society is held to signify a greater emphasis on cultural survival than on economic considerations. The fact is, of course, that farming (and the various professions and trades ancillary to a basically rural society) are no less "economic" than are the commercial and industrial activities of a different form of society. Furthermore, as John Porter has pointed out, "French-Canadian political leaders have ruled Quebec... Within Quebec, French-Canadian elites have had through the political system ultimate control of natural resources."⁽¹⁾ That is to say, in French Canada certain kinds of economic organization were consciously chosen partly because they were of advantage to particular elites and partly because they were deemed necessary to survival. The point is that the same may be said of English-speaking Canada and in it the concern for survival was no less central than has been the case in French Canada. Because economic expansion and change were seen as necessary to survival by most English-speaking Canadians while economic consolidation and stability were seen as essential by French Canadian leaders does not mean that the one group was more concerned with survival than the other.

1. Porter, Vertical Mosaic, pp. 92-3. It is reasonable to argue that the Quiet Revolution in present-day Quebec is startling proof of this fact. The overthrow of one elite by another (with very different visions of the economic requirements of la survivance) underlines the close relationship between political ideology and economic organization.

2. The Roles of "Survival" and "Nationalism" in the Maritimes

The second aspect of the emphasis given to economic interest as the determinant of English-speaking attitudes towards survival is the role supposedly played by such interest within the Confederation movement. Here the effect of regional differences is of greatest importance. We have already noted the comparatively stable prosperity of the Atlantic region in the 1860's. It was this situation, complementing the more pronounced Maritime's emphasis on racial superiority and the imperial tie, that led the region to a very critical view of Canadian motives. The Maritimes were very much concerned with the survival of their identity and way of life - it was because of this that they were so conveniently assembled at Charlottetown in 1864 - but they did not really agree with the Canadians that expansion was necessary to survival. Indeed it was the expansionist "prodigality" of the Canadians that most Maritimers feared as a threat to their own survival. Thus Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland refused to enter Confederation while heroic manipulation alone secured Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. It was an intense desire to survive, rather than lack of concern with survival, that governed the reluctant attitude of the Maritimes - and this attitude was deeply affected by the cultural traditions of the region. Conversely, at each stage of Maritimes integration into Confederation (from 1864 to 1949) questions of politics and cultural protection appear to have been predominant, while economic considerations were viewed essentially in the light of their impact upon regional survival.

At one time or another, throughout the Confederation period and during the cyclical furor over 'Maritimes Rights', various alternatives - provincial status within Confederation, secession and independence, annexation to the United States, and even, in the case of Newfoundland, reversion to imperial protection - have been considered. In each case, however, the overriding preoccupation has been with the survival of the Maritimes identity - or of a particular part of it. In the debates on the 1886 secession resolutions in Nova Scotia W. S. Fielding and his colleagues argued stoutly that the calamitous decline in the well-being of the region was the result of tariff policies imposed by Ottawa - policies which diminished the Maritimes' competitive position on the eastern seaboard, raised the costs of import from Britain and the United States (as well as from central Canada) and generally made unacceptably painful the Maritime transition to the new age of iron and steam. Like the South in the United States in the years following the 1816 adoption of a protective tariff, the Maritimes suffered from the policy's unequal incidence. The Fielding secession resolutions may be compared to Calhoun's nullification doctrine and the South Carolina action against the tariff in 1832-33. In each case a region with a high sense of identity and a strong wish to survive as a cultural entity offered a substantial modification to the increasingly majoritarian and centralizing attitudes of a more populous, industrial section of its federation. In the case of the South, regional resistance led to 'better terms' in the shape of a twenty year tariff reduction formula. In the case of the Maritimes, 'better

terms' took the form of federal bounties to the coal-steel industry (on top of the existing coal protection built into the tariff of 1879, and the continuing heavy subsidy to railway building.)

Maritime concern about survival of a region with a slower pace of life and a more generally accepted emphasis on British origins produced successive waves of agitation for equalization policies. Yet while their demands frequently appeared to imply a wish to follow the path of central Canada toward industrialization, in fact the Maritimes have seen higher subsidies, moderate diversification of their economy, and the most recent equalization and local development policies essentially as means to the preservation of a distinctive, regional way of life. Whether their attitude in this matter has been realistic is far less important than the fact that the attitude exists. It is evident from the 1886 debates, from the Duncan Commission of 1926,⁽²⁾ the Nova Scotia Economic Enquiry of 1934,⁽³⁾ and countless editorials throughout the whole post-Confederation period, that Maritimers have consistently sought the protection of their cultural traditions by hard bargaining and specific political action designed to offset a too sharp decline in their economic welfare relative to that of the rest of the country.

2. Report of the Royal Commission on Maritime Claims (Ottawa, 1926)

3. Report of the Royal Commission of Economic Enquiry (Halifax, 1934)

Their success in this policy has been variable but, overall, considerable. As Mackenzie King noted, after implementing the terms of the Duncan Commission Report within a year of the Report's publication: "I have redeemed my pledge made at the time of the elections in a large and 'statesmanlike' manner, and I shall be amazed if the Maritimes do not recognize this and respond to my loyalty to their needs and cause."⁽⁴⁾

King also observed that one of the chief reasons for his prompt response to Maritime claims was the presence in his cabinet of J. L. Ralston, his senior Maritimes minister: "Ralston has been tenacious in the manner in which he has fought for the Maritimes. He is a splendid minister, a really admirable man and the greatest possible help in Council."⁽⁵⁾ Not only did Ralston truly represent the Maritimes in 1926, he did so equally, if in another respect, during the second world war. And in this respect he clearly revealed the ambivalent position of the Maritimes' culture - still heavily affected by its sense of racial identity and its Atlantic-imperial connections, yet increasingly accepting a national Canadian role. Thus Ralston's insistent pressure for conscription was the product of a dual concept of Canadian national obligations based upon an English-speaking majority (yet a majority which should recognize the special claim to cultural differentness of the

4. Quoted in H.B.Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, vol.II, 1924-32, (Toronto, 1963), p.224.

5. Neatby, King, p.223.

Maritimes), and of imperial duty stemming from the Maritimes' cultural identification with Britain. And, still in the 1940's there was the strong racial strain. As Mackenzie King recorded his conversation with Ralston in 1942 on the question of whether a conscription order should precede or follow a debate in the House, Ralston "thought all my action was towards pacifying the French... It would mean the whole business over again, and having the country run by Quebec, to have another debate."⁽⁶⁾

From what has been said already about the special Maritime contribution to English-speaking Canadian culture a further, dependent fact, may be derived - but this fact deserves specification and emphasis. From the conditions of geographic isolation and leisurely economic development sprang not only a continuing filial relationship to the imperial idea, but a remarkable concentration upon politics per se. Amongst English-speaking Canadians Maritimers are by far the most political. Not only did they provide a majority of the national-level spokesmen for the imperial connection (such as Sir Charles Tupper, Sir George Parkin, Sir Robert Borden and Lord Bennett) their way of life has given special kudos to public careers. Partly because of more limited economic opportunities in the region and partly because of an early-developed tradition of political life the most notable Maritime export has been that of politicians. In terms of population a disproportionate number of our national political figures have come from the Maritimes and these

6. Quoted in J. W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, vol. I 1939-44, (Toronto, 1960) p.384.

have served to emphasize the multiplicity of English-speaking Canadian loyalties - the imperial, the regional and the national. From the earliest Confederation days the Maritimers defended provincial and regional rights most vigorously, yet, as the custom of resentment wore thin under cumulative better terms, equalization and developmental policies, and as the habit of regarding themselves as Canadians grew stronger, they have reinforced a revival of English-speaking Canadian nationalism. In some respects this has been a working out of the point of view of those Maritimers who did originally support Confederation. It is a point of view well expressed as early as 1860 by the young Dr. Tupper:

It must be evident to everyone in the least degree acquainted with our history, that at present we are without name or nationality - comparatively destitute of influence and of the means of occupying the position to which we may justly aspire. What is a British-American but a man regarded as a mere dependent upon an Empire which, however great and glorious, does not recognize him as entitled to any voice in her Senate, or possessing any interests worthy of Imperial regard. This may seem harsh, but the past is pregnant with illustrations of its truth. What voice or influence had New Brunswick when an English peer settled most amicably the dispute with an adjoining country by giving away a large and important slice of her territory to a foreign power? Where were the interests of these Maritime Provinces when another English nobleman relieved England of the necessity of protecting our fisheries by giving them away to the same Republic, without obtaining any adequate consideration for a sacrifice so immense?.....

The systematic exclusion of colonists from gubernatorial positions must forever prevent us from having great men. The human mind naturally adapts itself to the position it occupies. The most gigantic intellect may be dwarfed by being 'cribbed, cabined, and confined.' It requires a great country and great circumstances to develop great men...."(7)

7. Speech at St. John, N.B., quoted in Sir Charles Tupper, Recollections of Sixty Years in Canada (Toronto, 1914), pp.17-22.

While Sir Charles was to insist upon and to receive an almost inordinate number of political rewards, and at the end his nest was not entirely unfeathered, his career was a model for many Maritimers of somewhat greater scruple - men who took to Ottawa a combined regard for the Canadian nation and for the differences of region.

It remains to be said that the political talents produced by the culture of the Maritimes have affected the nature of English-speaking Canadian nationalism not only by insistence on the British connection and the national rights of an English Canadian majority - but by the infusion of a spirit of compromise and adjustment to long-enduring realities. A startling example of this has been the extent to which the Maritimes, once the home of the most ardent imperialism and of an almost total indifference towards French Canada, have come to endorse not only regional rights but also multi-racialism and co-operative federalism. This change will be further noted in Section 'C'.

3. "Nationalism" and "Race" in Central Canada

I have already stressed the commercial basis of the culture of the Anglo-Quebeckers, as well as the increasingly commercial bent of Upper Canadian society - especially of its Grit leaders. In the Confederation period these two English-speaking societies found much about which to compete and regional differences certainly cut more deeply between them than was the case with any sub-regional differences within French Canadian society. Yet there was much that Upper Canada and the Anglo-Quebeckers had in common. And

of all their shared aspirations the hope of survival as a distinct English-speaking culture was foremost.

While the difficulties experienced by the Canadian economy (and particularly its transportation problems and costs, and the military threat posed by the American Civil War were important influences leading to Confederation, they and other influences all underlined the essential motive of the English-speaking Canadians of central Canada: the purpose of surviving. . No one can read the debates of the Canadian Legislative Assembly of 1865 without sensing the dominant concern of the English-speaking members. And while their concepts of survival varied, according to region, the competing ideas blended into a clear statement of political nationality. And curiously, the nationalism which evolved as an expression of English-speaking Canadian culture was in recognition of two apparently opposing facets of the quasi-ethnic bond with Great Britain. These were the rising tide of imperial separation in England and the deepening appreciation of English-speaking Canadians that the survival of their culture in North America depended, and would so depend for some time, upon maintenance of the imperial tie. As (Sir) John Rose put it in the Confederation Debates:

It cannot be denied that there is a state of public opinion growing up in England just now - not confined, as it was a few years ago, to a class of extreme theorists - that the connection which subsists between the colonists - Canada especially - and the Mother Country, is a source of expense and danger. It cannot be denied that that kind of opinion has obtained a good deal more force within the last few years, than those of us who desire to maintain the connection between these colonies and England would like that it should have obtained; and we

cannot ignore the consequences which that increasing volume of public opinion may have upon the legislation of England.....

I put aside, for the moment, the instinct of attachment to the Mother Country, and I put the case on this ground alone, that the necessity of self-preservation will for centuries - for generations at all events - prevent the possibility of these colonies asserting their independence of England, unless it were, indeed, to become a portion of the republic which adjoins us, and to which, I think, it is neither the interest nor the inclination of any member of this House to become united. (Hear, hear.)...

We will have a sentiment of nationality among ourselves; and I consider it to be one of the first duties of a statesman to inculcate that national feeling that gives the people a strong interest in their country's welfare.... We shall feel very differently from what we do now as colonists, apart and alienated from each other, and in some respects jealous of one another.(8)

Rose went on quite precisely to point out that the survival of English-speaking Canadian culture required expansion, a strong central government and a stream of immigration from the British isles. In such immigration, as Rose put it,

I see one of the great elements we will have to look to for the perpetuation of the attachment of this country to the Crown. We have not, in time past, been able to devise or carry out any extensive system of immigration. We could not, in our divided and isolated condition, offer those attractions which we will be enabled to offer to emigrants when we can throw open to them the choice of a large country, a country which will have a name and a nationality - a country in which they and we can all feel an honest pride..... We shall then not only have the ordinary motive to present the emigrants, of self interest - the opportunity to make money merely, but the other interest of attachment in a permanent way, to the soil, without a desire to go back to the Mother Country after a competence shall have been gained - for the sentiment of nationality will soon take root among us.

While many English-speaking Canadians were acutely aware of the importance of economic relations with the United States (and certainly

John Rose was more interested than most) it is extremely significant that they appealed with assurance to a nascent national feeling. It was equally significant that they clearly recognized the origin of such feeling in fears for the loss of identity. The fears were, partly because of the nature of the Clear Grit political agitation and partly because of the economic-military threat of the Civil War centred both upon 'French domination' and American Manifest Destiny. And to understand the inner springs of the new English-speaking Canadian nationalism it is important to observe the unequal balance between these two points of fear. It was the reverse of the balance which existed between the same kinds of concern in the minds of most French Canadians.

In the case of the English-speaking central Canadians the principal concern was the American republican democracy. D'Arcy McGee stated this whimsically (although it was a major theme throughout the 1865 debates): "But if we are to have a universal democracy on this continent, the Lower Provinces - the smaller fragments - will be 'gobbled up' first, and we will come in afterwards by way of dessert."⁽⁹⁾ French Canadian spokesmen also paid homage to the fear of continental absorption as when the Premier, (Sir) E. P. Taché observed, "If the opportunity which now presented itself were

allowed to pass unimproved, whether we would or would not, we would be forced into the American Union by violence, and if not by violence, would be placed on an inclined plane which would carry us there insensibly."⁽¹⁰⁾ But the great bulk of the French Canadian contribution to the debates was occupied with precise delineation of the safeguards for cultural autonomy within the proposed Confederation. For their survival, consolidation and protection against 'anglicization' were the keynotes. Taché made this point in its most extreme form, and repeated it in French for greater certainty: "If a federal union were obtained it would be tantamount to a separation of the provinces, and Lower Canada would thereby preserve its autonomy together with all the institutions it held so dear, and over which they could exercise the watchfulness and the surveillance necessary to preserve them unimpaired."

For the English-speaking Canadians survival lay not in consolidation but in expansion. If this involved special guarantees for the Anglo-Quebeckers (so tenaciously affirmed by Galt) it meant, far more importantly, acquisition of the West, closer connections with the Maritimes and a flow of immigrants to give the new nation weight against the American giant. The spirit of racial accommodation which is unmistakably evident throughout the debates and the succeeding negotiations simply underlines the essential and optimistic

10. Confederation Debates, p.218

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confidence with which English-speaking Canadians met their fears about cultural survival. That there were hopes (usually unspoken) that expansion and immigration would "swamp the French" is undoubted. But such speculation was essentially negative and secondary to the knowledge that, even as Taché put it, if the French Canadians were "in a majority in Lower Canada, the English would be in a majority in the Central Government, and that no act of real injustice [in Lower Canada] could take place, even if there were a disposition to perpetrate it, without its being reversed there."

To talk of confidence expressed as a cultural-political response to the threat of non-survival is, of course, to lead directly into the question of the equality of the "two founding races."

It is a question that may be quickly answered. To neither the French Canadian nor the English-speaking Canadian (Maritimer, Anglo-Quebecker or Upper Canadian) was this ever a real question. It is particularly important to make this point precisely since it bears not only upon the general theme of the present Royal Commission, but even more directly upon the theme of this essay. For the French Canadians, the above references to Taché's speech supporting the Confederation resolutions could be multiplied many times, from a dozen different sources, all emphasizing the non-equal and therefore specifically protected position of the French Canadians. For the English-speaking Canadians John A. Macdonald presented the most important of the many statements bearing on the question of cultural equality. Explaining away his own preference for a legislative union

he used as his chief justification the inequality of the two cultures: "In the first place [a legislative union] would not meet the assent of the people of Lower Canada, because they felt that in their peculiar position - being in a minority, with a different language, nationality and religion from the majority, - in case of a junction with the other provinces, their institutions and their laws might be assailed...."(11)

Macdonald's use of the term 'nationality' was perhaps not less significant than his reference to the majority-minority question. Like most people in the 1860's (and, for that matter, the 1960's) he used the word in two senses. The use in the above quotation is in the sense of race, with cultural overtones. He used it in its larger, political sense several times in the same speech. We would, he said, take our place amongst the nations of the world and, "instead of looking upon us as a merely dependent colony, England will have in us a friendly nation." Macdonald left no doubt about the full political meaning he attached to this use of the word when he predicted that as Canada grew "England will more see the advantage of maintaining the alliance between British North America and herself." He employed the word 'alliance' several times in the Confederation Debates and it is undoubtedly the word which most clearly expressed the hopes of English-speaking central Canadians - hopes of sustaining their cultural identity and increasing their independence.

11. Confederation Debates, p.27

Central to the sense of identity of these people (and it was a point on which Maritimers and central Canadians agreed) was the firm belief that the emerging democracy of Canada was essentially different from that of the United States, and that the proposed federation would be different also: it would be, like the parliamentary system itself, not one in which 'direct democracy' and the 'states' were the unqualified centres of power. Again, Macdonald put it most succinctly when he observed at the Quebec Conference, "Thus we shall have a strong and lasting government under which we can work out constitutional liberty as opposed to democracy, and be able to protect the minority by having a powerful central government."⁽¹²⁾ Nor can there be any doubt that the representatives of English-speaking central Canada in the Legislative Assembly debated concurred with Macdonald when he noted that the guarantees to local cultural rights depended upon a reciprocal action: "The Lower Canadians would not have worked cheerfully under [representation by population within United Canada], but would have ceased to be what they are now - a nationality with representatives in Parliament, governed by general principles, and dividing according to their political opinions - and would have been in great danger of becoming a faction, forgetful of national obligations, and only actuated by a desire to defend their own sectional interests. their own laws and their own institutions." That is, the English-speaking view of the new nation was that local liberties, including

12. J. Pope, Confederation Documents (Toronto, 1895) p.54

French Canadian nationality, would be chiefly safeguarded by a vital central government founded upon the principles of the British constitution, the lessons of the central Canadian union, and abhorrence of majoritarian republican democracy.

More important than either race or region in the establishment of this kind of nation was the pragmatism of the English-speaking Canadians. The most eloquent testimony to the experimentalism of their culture can be found in two further circumstances of the day. One was the endorsement of such an approach by George Brown, and the other was the specific recognition of the exceptionally political nature of the nation that was to be founded.

Pragmatic conciliation shone through Brown's contribution to the Confederation Debates:

Here is a people composed of two distinct races, speaking different languages, with religious and social and municipal and educational institutions totally different; with sectional hostilities of such a character as to render government for many years well nigh impossible; with a Constitution so unjust in the view of one section as to justify any resort to enforce a remedy. And yet, sir, here we sit, patiently and temperately discussing how these great evils and hostilities may justly and amicably be swept away forever. (Hear, hear.) We are endeavouring to adjust harmoniously greater difficulties than have plunged other countries into all the horrors of civil war. We are striving to do peacefully and satisfactorily what Holland and Belgium, after years of strife, were unable to accomplish.... We are seeking to do without foreign intervention that which deluged in blood the sunny plains of Italy. We are striving to settle forever issues hardly less momentous than those which have rent the neighbouring republic and are now exposing it to all the horrors of civil war.

While the English-speaking advocates of federation and nationality expected emotional flesh to clothe the bones of a political

experiment, they by no means underestimated the purely political origins of the nation. In this sense Canada stands as a leading illustration of Hans Kohn's definition of post-1789 nationalism. It is a definition similar to that applied by Gertrude Stein to the rose: A nation is a nation when it decides to be a nation. Having decided to safeguard British constitutional principles as well as regional cultural differences and identities the negotiators of 1864-7 determined that the forms of political nationality were essential. That the decision was taken both on grounds of economic interest and on grounds which had nothing to do with economics is of first importance. I have already suggested the ambivalence of the Maritimes approach to the question in the 1860's. Macdonald's reference to this problem during the Quebec Conference is most revealing:

To Nova Scotia and New Brunswick Canada holds out the Intercolonial road intimately bound up with the question of union. As Mr. Tilley says, 'it is absolutely necessary.' When the Intercolonial road was first proposed, it was considered as a great commercial work. We had then no Grand Trunk Railway, at least but very slight connection with the seaboard. So long as there is no war Canada can communicate [with the Lower Provinces] through the States. Commercially the value of the Lower Provinces has decreased to Canada, but in military respects they are very essential. The Intercolonial road must be a political consequence of a political union.

English-speaking Canadian nationalism was born of the desire for cultural survival and this aspiration led to racial conciliation, political bargaining to overcome the extremes of regional differentiation, and expansion as defence against American nibbling at the fringes of British North America. Nor did the Conservative wing

of the 1864 coalition monopolize the theme of expansionist nationalism. At Quebec George Brown made it clear that more than prairie farmland was at stake as far as the Grits were concerned:

It must be a federal and not a legislative union. That is the main object of my motion, together with the inclusion of the North-West Provinces. The latter opens up a wide question. The population of the Red River Settlement is now 12,000 and we must look forward to the day of settlement and occupation of that country. The inclusion of British Columbia and Vancouver Island is rather an extreme proposition, but it would be wrong to exclude them in the formation of the scheme. The Americans are encroaching. (13)

Perhaps the most essential two points emerging from an examination of the Confederation period are: the English-speaking Canadian purpose of protecting a culture which was founded upon British legal-political forms and which was consciously (if not always accurately) distinguished from that of the United States and the recognition of the need to guarantee both regional variations within the English-speaking portions of the country and the more pronounced cultural differences of French Canada. Race, as such, seldom entered the discussions although British institutions as measuring sticks of a healthy 'Canadian' culture were frequently appealed to. Regionalism, while it was pragmatically recognized as a fact, was something to be modified by the growth of new loyalties to a strong central government - which, in turn, would serve as a final guarantor of minority cultural rights against over-zealous provincial majorities.

4. Growth and Changes in English-speaking Canadian Nationalism

The basic cultural attitudes of the English-speaking Canadians have remained remarkably consistent since 1867. What has changed has been the view of how best these attitudes can find effective political expression to the end that their chief protection, the Canadian national state may survive. The changes in political-constitutional views have been pronounced. Yet while they have been influenced both by regional differences and the impact of racial change in the composition of the Canadian population they have in no way minimized the central proposition of a political nation.

Incorporation of the prairies, British Columbia and the northern territories had the double effect of intensifying national feeling amongst English-speaking Canadians and strengthening the arguments for retaining a large measure of local autonomy. In the case of British Columbia and the prairies, extension of the Canadian party system, together with a continuing predominance of English-speaking people as settlement grew, meant extension of British institutions, legal concepts, and Protestant predilections. The manner in which the culture of English-speaking central Canada spread westward is not difficult to illustrate. In Manitoba the early influence of Grit-Ontarians was the dominant fact, as the Bruce peninsula emptied its sons into the new province. In Saskatchewan and Alberta, while thousands of Americans poured north in the settlement years prior to the first world war, political dominance of

émigré central Canadians remained intact, and was even strengthened by the admixture of central Europeans who, as John Porter has shown, remained excluded from the political elite for many years. Even the heavy immigration from the British isles during the Wheat Boom did not shake the political control of ex-central Canadians. Signs in shop windows and at factory gates indicating that "No English need apply" are eloquent testimony to the fact that Britishism in the Canadian West had to take on Canadian hues before it was acceptable.

One of the most striking examples of the deep roots put down by the Canadian version of British institutions is the history of the Progressive movement. The movement's origins lay deep in the isolation of the prairies (although its eventual strength was the greater because farmers' grievances in Ontario became a source of additional support). Resentment of what appeared to be special regional advantages provided by Ottawa's railway, natural resources and tariff policies led to countervailing actions - economic, political and social. While the influence of American examples in the field of farmer protest was significant, the ultimate difference from the American experience is still more so.

The social purpose of the Grange and similar farmer organizations, and the economic purpose of the co-operatives led, in the Canadian case, much more directly and quickly to government intervention in the grain trade and to governmental use of railway control and ownership as a means of regional equalization. In the political field the attempt to apply an American-style direct democracy through

devices such as constituency independence, recall and the rest was no more successful than was the doctrine of 'group government'. Both floundered on the established customs of the parliamentary party system. The ultimate result of regional protest in the English-speaking Canadian West was the establishment of two new political parties (with strength in more than one province) and expanding use of public planning and ownership. In the process, the West developed both an interest in securing local autonomy and a growing concern with national purposes that were already characteristic of the English-speaking nationalism of the Maritimes and central Canada. The extent to which English-speaking Canadian regionalism is compatible with a high degree of attachment to the idea of a Canadian national state is suggested by the Conservative leadership names of Meighen, Bennett, Bracken and Diefenbaker....as it is also by the names of influential Liberals such as Sifton and Dafoe.

Changes in the English-speaking concept of nationalism came also as a result of the accommodations which were slowly made in the face of heavy European immigration. In the years up to the first world war (and, indeed, well into the inter-war years) racial prejudice against people from middle, southern, and southeastern Europe was marked. In these years the dominant opinion was that tolerance of the first generation and 'Canadianization' of the second would be the obvious pattern. As the West gained confidence after the depression years of the 'thirties', however, it met the new immigration following the second world war in an entirely different

manner. By then, assimilation had become almost a nasty word. English-speaking Canadians, both in Ontario and the West, looked to immigration as a means of enriching their society as well as a means of increasing the pace of development. The concept of a mosaic as opposed to a melting pot became popular.

That this concept was often given lip service rather than genuine acceptance affects very little its importance in understanding cultural attitudes. In actual practice the change of attitude was reflected not in specific measures for the support of racial-cultural differences but in an absence of the pressures to conform to any pre-cast Canadianism. Put in a different way, English-speaking Canadian culture, having established a sense of security (the self-conscious search for 'identity' which was still evident in the early 1950's has been found superfluous in the 1960's) has come to accept a mild multiculturalism because its institutions and nationalism have proven sufficiently enduring to withstand a steadily shifting population balance. It was from this more secure English-speaking nationalism that Mr. Diefenbaker in the late 1950's was able to obtain a good deal of support for his 'vision' of northern development. The north was seen as a unifying force and a focus of national interest, whereas in the 1920's it had frequently been an area in which competing provincial development of mining and lumbering had emphasized regionalism.

Multiculturalism, or the minimizing of a racial basis of culture, has become an essential component of English-speaking Canadian nationalism - just as the tolerance and protection of

provincial autonomy has been integrated with the idea of the Canadian political state. Two factors in this development, which have not been suggested up to this point, must now be mentioned. One is the gradual disappearance of the Anglo-Saxon racial superiority doctrine and the other is the severance of the umbilical cord from London. The two are interrelated at several points.

In expansion westward the old Upper Canadian Grit fear of French and papal domination was carried to the prairies. Out of this grew the struggle over Manitoba schools and the Autonomy Bills of 1905. As I have suggested, however, this tended to be a religious and political rather than a racial tension. And curiously those English-speaking Canadians of the late nineteenth century who gave most vigorous voice to Anglo-Saxon superiority doctrines were those who seemed best able to get along politically with French Canadians. Canada Firsters, Imperial Federationists and the Tories in general (at least until 1896) managed the difficult feat of incorporating the French in a mystique of the northern races. People like William Kirby, Sir J. G. Bourinot, Castell Hopkins, Colonel George Denison, Principal Grant and Sir George Parkin provided the Conservatives with a romantic version of French Canada which enabled them to sustain their optimism about conservative national purposes. According to this version the French Canadians not only measured up to the responsibilities of self-government because, while they were not Anglo-Saxon they were northern, but they also had other positive cultural virtues. They believed in a Christian society, they shared a common loyalty to the Crown, they preferred a hierarchical and agrarian

society and held suspect the crasser aspects of liberalism and industrialism. In short they could be trusted as a stabilizing force in the growth of an organic Canadian society. Conversely, English-speaking Liberals (for whom, in many respects, Goldwin Smith spoke) were skeptical of conservative nationalism because it seemed able to work with the French Canadians. Thus the Smith version of French Canada described a corrupt, feudal, anti-liberal society whose resistance to Anglo-Saxon progress prompted consideration of union with the United States as the only means of eliminating the bane of Jesuitical reaction.

Both these positions were sharply modified by events from 1896 to 1918. The Tories in all regions experienced a cumulative disillusionment as the resurgence of French Canadian nationalism under the influence of Bourassa seemed to them to contradict their earlier conception -- particularly that aspect of the romantic French Canadian as a martial figure. Conversely, the Liberals, finding new political support in Quebec, took an increasingly conciliatory position on the special rights of French Canada. In the trauma of the first world war's conscription crisis English-speaking Conservatism made its most fervent stand in favour of a Canadian nationalism firmly linked to the Empire-Commonwealth; and the deep Conservative resentment of Quebec's "dualloyalty" left the Tory party unable to rebuild its former base in French Canada.

Yet the essential lesson to be found in the political evolution and the changing racial composition of English-speaking Canada is that the original pragmatism of Confederation has remained, while resort

to ideas of Anglo-Saxon or British superiority has virtually disappeared. Although, as is the case with any political-economic elite, the dominance of British-descended Canadians which was early established and maintained through the years of territorial expansion has been tenacious, it has depended less and less upon overt racial concepts. And the holders of that dominance have shown a remarkable willingness to practice Macdonald's politics of conciliation. The results of this maturation of English-speaking Canadian nationalism will be noted more specifically in the concluding chapter, but here I wish to suggest two basic reasons for the essentially non-racial assumptions of contemporary English-speaking Canada.

The first reason is the simple fact of survival. As Macdonald had anticipated, the culture of English-speaking Canada was strengthened by the federal arrangement of 1867 and the consequent expansion westward. Although regionalism and provincial rights have been far more influential than Macdonald would have wished, and crises have arisen over the federal division of powers and the entrenched rights of minorities, the crises have been survived. They have been survived at least in part because regional differences and ambitions have led English-speaking Canadians to take different views at different times on the question of federal as opposed to provincial jurisdiction - and this has frequently meant the possibility of political alliance between the majority wing of Quebec politics and important sections of English-speaking opinion. Mowat and Mercier, Laurier and Fielding, Ferguson and Taschereau,

King and Lapointe, Robarts and Lesage all illustrate the operation of the political accommodations inherently required by the Canadian experiment. In the English-speaking view the history of such accommodation is evidence of the validity of the assumptions made by Macdonald and Cartier. The Canadian political state survived because it proved more satisfactory than any other arrangement for the northern part of the continent - and its survival has added to mere acceptance some of the stuff of national loyalty. In the English-speaking view, that national loyalty implies a state in which race is not of consequence, but one in which, nevertheless, regional and cultural differences are open to constant accommodation. The steady growth of this attitude suggests the second major reason for the optimism and basically conciliatory attitude of English-speaking culture in Canada today.

During the early years of Confederation, the English-speaking goal of survival dictated an emphasis on the imperial tie as defence against the American colossus, while the crises involving provincial powers and minority rights served to continue racial prejudices which were, in the first instance, an offshoot either of regional indifference (as in the case of the Maritimes) or of sectional competition as in the case of central Canada. The sense of insecurity which led to racial outbursts and to annexation fevers, began to pass most significantly in the 1920's and 1930's. And a major reflection of the change was the rapid advance in those years toward national independence. The fact that this advance was, itself, partly the result of political accommodation following the crises surrounding the Canadian role in 'imperial wars' is significant of the extent to

which English-speaking Canadian culture accepted the continuing requirement of political conciliation. But it is, too, a direct reflection of growing confidence in the survival of that culture - a reflection seen also in the 'nationalist' movements in the arts, broadcasting, economic policies and politics. It is no accident that the C.C.F., for example, was at least as much a nationalist movement as it was a socialist party.

The separate declaration of war in 1939, the war effort itself, and the continued growth of Ottawa's role in economic policy, social welfare planning, subsidization of education and cultural activities, and 'regional equalization', continued in the late 1940's and 1950's to express English-speaking Canada's confidence in the survival of its culture. That such tendencies went a good deal further than was consonant with a similar Quebec confidence in survivance became very evident as the Quiet Revolution got under way and led to the Lesage provincial victory in 1960. But to suggest that the growth of centralism as an expression of English-speaking Canadian nationalism was or is the only and inevitable expression of that nationalism is to miss entirely the meaning of Canadian political and cultural history.

The crucial point, in terms of cultural consciousness, is that at the very time when English-speaking Canada completed the process of ending its emotional-political dependence upon London (as the principal guarantor of survival) and moved confidently towards a truly independent development, French Canada felt the need of external support for its cultural identity. Somewhat as English-speaking Canadians in the late nineteenth century looked to Britain for

protection and for standards of culture, now French Canada, having modified its Ultramontanism and launched a kind of Gallican anti-clericalism, looks across the Atlantic for renewed contacts with its mother country for cultural sustenance. That English-speaking Canadians should find this sudden emphasis on the enveloping identity of Latin civilization somewhat surprising, after generations of French-Canadian resistance to French 'atheism', is partly because of their own recent emergence from a similar situation.

C. THE PRESENT CRISIS

First, we in Ontario consider ourselves to be Canadians. Second, we recognize that the goals and objectives of other Canadians in other provinces may differ markedly from ours. Third, we believe that the future of Confederation rests in the reconciliation and accommodation of these various points of view. Fourth, we believe that such reconciliation and accommodation can best be achieved - and perhaps only be achieved - if they are based upon free and frank statements of positions openly made and received by open minds.

- Premier John Robarts to an
editors' conference, 1965.

CHAPTER IV. CONCLUSIONS

1. The Dangers of Inflation

Any crisis can be inflated beyond its "objective" meaning. In the case of the present crisis of Confederation there has been much inflation to the point where the most perilous aspect of that crisis is the failure of perspective. It has been my purpose in this essay to suggest the kind of perspective from which English-speaking Canadian culture views the problems created by the growth of its own nationalism and the survivalist demands of Quebec.

The principal conclusion is that the nationalism of English-speaking Canadian culture has been based always upon a highly pragmatic approach to politics. It has been cyclically affected by assertions from within its own culture of regional and provincial claims both to autonomy and to positive national policies of equalization. It has, most importantly, conceived of the Canadian political nation as comprising marked regional and cultural differences - differences without which our political nationality would be unrecognizable and would even cease to exist. While many crises of the past have been exacerbated by feelings of cultural insecurity, the achievement of full independence (both political and emotional) removed most of the unhappy effects of insecurity. The enthusiasm with which English-speaking Canadians welcomed the influence of European immigration following the second world war is in sharp contrast to earlier experiences with immigration while changes in the attitudes to the arts and the mores of social intercourse attest to the depth of the new influences.

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But much the most important aspect of the continuing pragmatism of English-speaking Canadian culture has been the basic and comprehensive response that it has presented to the resurgence in the 1960's of Quebec nationalism. Only those who have failed to

appreciate the flexibility of English-speaking politics in the past, and the confidence conveyed by successful survival are likely to be surprised by the present response. Moreover, the extent of the response is easily minimized by anyone who does not consider the degree to which English-speaking Canada, in the 1940's and 1950's was modifying the regional differences within its culture and fastening deepened loyalties to the concepts of national planning. If it was these very facts to which Quebec took most exception it remains true, also, that to modify them at the very point of their emergence called for an extreme of flexibility and a desire to maintain the Canadian experiment that are considerably more impressive than one would imagine from the Preliminary Report issued by the present Royal Commission. The survival of Canada as a political nation depends to a very large extent upon willingness to recognize the depth of the English-speaking response - and that survival will certainly not be rendered more likely by assertions of the failure of English-speaking culture to recognize the nature of Quebec nationalism.

A summary of the political-constitutional changes already achieved, together with evidence of the acceptance by English-speaking Canada of many redefined Quebec goals strongly suggests the danger inherent in pressing for a pace or direction of change much different from that already achieved.

2. The Quiet Revolution and English-Speaking Pragmatism

Many leaders of Quebec opinion since 1960 have called for a dialogue between the "two founding races" of Canada as a means to solving the crisis of French Canadian aspirations. In these frequently repeated requests the spokesmen usually assume the need of English-speaking Canada first to "define" itself and then to understand the new spirit and goals of the other founding race. My previous argument suggests that the concept of two equal bargaining parties in Canadian Confederation has never been a part of the culture of English-speaking Canada -- and, indeed, was not a part of French Canadian thought in the early Confederation period. As English-speaking Canada grew more and more 'multi-racial' in its composition, the prospect of returning to a racial basis of politics (let alone to a myth of equality of only two founding races) became less and less probable.

On the other hand the pragmatic spirit of the original Confederation movement has continued to be the dominant feature of the evolving multi-racial English-speaking Canada. That this culture has retained an important place for surviving provincial and regional loyalties and has fought shy of elaborate definitions of its identity must not obscure the fact that it places an extremely high value on the fact of its survival. One is tempted to see irony in the Quebec claims that there is no English-speaking sense of identity and the very evident sense of just such an identity in the 1950's and 1960's. The search for identity, with its Gallic overtones, is much more prominent in Quebec than it is in the rest

of the country not because the rest of the country lacks such a sense, but for precisely the reverse reason.

Indeed, the deep concern about the new nationalism of Quebec stems from English-speaking confidence in the validity of a tolerant multi-racial political nation. English-speaking Canadian nationalism has always (and with progressive insistence) incorporated the idea of a specially guaranteed French-speaking culture based upon the province of Quebec and including certain federal and provincial provision for extension of such culture in the wake of population movement. To argue (from the various schools questions, conscription crises and imbalance of appointments in the federal civil service) that because that idea has not been everywhere and even-handedly implemented the idea itself is invalid is to ignore the possibilities that any study of Canadian political compromise make evident.

How, in fact, has English-speaking Canada responded to the restatement of Quebec goals? The most significant response has been the virtual dismantling of federal-provincial shared-cost programmes in economic development and social welfare. The opting-out formula and increasing use of dominion-provincial consultation have brought to a halt the postwar trend toward Ottawa-centered national planning and replaced it with a system in which the provinces control the spending of a vastly increased share of the 'national' revenue - already more than half the total. Expanding use of the machinery of dominion-provincial consultation, moreover, has already modified the role of the federal parliament very considerably. The programmes of the principal political parties have all taken account of these

changes and, in varying degree support the concept of 'co-operative federalism.' Perhaps the most striking response has been that of the New Democratic Party. While the Liberals, commanding the lion's share of Quebec's federal vote, have understandably been quick to respond to French Canadian demands for revision of appointments policy in the civil service and a practical restructuring of jurisdictions between Ottawa and Quebec, the shift in the socialist party's attitude underlines far more dramatically the extent of English-speaking Canadian response. Acceptance by the N.D.P. of a broad increase in provincial jurisdiction, its detailed proposals for co-operative federalism and support of bilingualism, all illustrate the essentially pragmatic nature of the politics of English-speaking Canadian culture. A party whose origins lie deep in regionalism and nationalism, which for most of its (C.C.F.) career was indelibly marked as English-speaking, and whose principles call for national economic planning of a rigorous sort has become at least as strong an advocate of a pragmatic approach to the survival of the Canadian national state as has the party which commands majority support in Quebec. That the change in approach occasioned resistance within the party is the measure of the response rather than proof of 'two solitudes'.

But beyond the fundamental changes in actual policies, beyond the advancement of individual public servants who have shown special interest and competence in the revised federalism that is emerging, and beyond the statements of the political parties, one cannot miss a broad popular response in English-speaking Canada. This response can be seen not only in newspaper editorials and discussion forums but in such things as an intensified concern with the teaching and



learning of the French language at all levels, and the establishment in Toronto of a college (Glendon College of York University) specifically designed for bilingual education for the public service and political leadership. While it is true that regional differences and distances affect the extent of the response, no one can miss the fact that the English-speaking concern is national in scope. Nor can one mistake the evidence provided by an escalation of provincial rightism in English-speaking provinces that the present crisis is not different in kind from similar debates in the past.

In the newspapers of English-speaking Canada one can see clearly enough the combined goals of retaining a nation to which loyalties have become attached and the preservation of a pragmatic political method which minimizes race as a decisive test of 'Canadianism'. The determination to place a limit on the growth of provincial states expresses a revived belief that Canadian cultural tolerance depends upon a balance of federal and provincial powers - a balance which has been, and obviously is now, open to almost constant readjustment. The further we move through the present crisis the clearer it becomes that the English-speaking culture of this country abhors either the creation or the revival of racial bases for Canadian nationality. As the Edmonton Journal put it: "Canada has enough problems without French-Canadians or English-Canadians manufacturing grievances from the bias and distortions of history."⁽¹⁾

1. March 8, 1965.

The manner in which the English-speaking press has dealt with the questions raised by the Quiet Revolution substantiates the argument that the culture for which it speaks, while accepting very basic changes in the practice of federalism, will decline to put its faith in a total constitutional re-writing; that it will insist rather that Canadian political history validates the method of specific adjustments and the retention of those forms which have been found viable instruments of an evolving nationality. The process of examining specific proposals as they arise is illustrated by a Winnipeg Free Press editorial:

Mr. Lesage's refusal to recognize the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in the controversy over off-shore mineral rights has had the natural consequence of provoking debate over the role of the court itself in our national life....It is sometimes suggested that the court might be made more acceptable if a certain number of the judges were provincial appointees. In 1949 Mr. Wilfrid Lauroix, a Liberal M.P., moved an amendment to the measure which would have required Ottawa to choose four of the nine justices from names submitted by the Quebec government...But the whole argument for change is that federal appointees will be presumed by themselves, and certainly by the general public, to be commissioned to represent the viewpoint of the authority, whether federal or provincial, appointing them. Every decision will then be a political decision....⁽²⁾

The editorial could be taken as resistance to change per se; but this would be to mistake entirely the pragmatic spirit behind it and to judge it out of the context of change which I have suggested above. An earlier comment on the same theme suggests more precisely the way in which English-speaking Canada views the Quiet Revolution as something which is negotiable and which is within the context of 'normal' federal-provincial relations:

2. August 5, 1965

A visitor to Canada this week might be forgiven for asking "Who's running this country?"... In Ottawa the government of the nation has been meeting with the ten provincial governments; and at least some of the subordinate governments not only have been openly defying the senior government but have said that they will defy the highest court in the land, should that be necessary.

The dispute is over off-shore mineral rights, and admittedly it is a difficult question....

But the Quebec B.C. axis - Mr. Lesage in Quebec City and Mr. Bennett in Victoria - will have nothing to do with the reference to the Supreme Court (made by Mr. Arthur Laing, minister of national resources). In unrestrained and most intemperate language both premiers have claimed that the question is political, not judicial; and that, court decision or no, they intend to keep off-shore rights for themselves....

Mr. Bennett and Mr. Lesage emerged from the federal-provincial meeting extremely angry and agitated because Ottawa has failed to give into their demands and withdraw its reference to the Supreme Court. The vigour of their reaction recalls the venerable story of the speaker whose notes were annotated in the margin, here and there, with the letters "aw - ylh". When asked what they meant, he explained, "Argument weak - yell like hell." Mr. Bennett and Mr. Lesage may be yelling for the same reason. (3)

Despite this editorial position (which was duplicated in many other English-speaking papers) perhaps the most instructive aspect of this particular constitutional issue was the Prime Minister's eventual position - that a judicial opinion would be sought but that the opinion would not rule out a political settlement of the question.

A pragmatic approach within the context of basic change is even more apparent in the English-speaking press of Quebec and Ontario.

An outstanding example of this is the acceptance by the Montreal Gazette of new political machinery:

These conferences (of provincial premiers) have demonstrated a vitality and a spirit of good will, and an awareness of common aims and interests that should do much to offset some of the fears that the country is moving apart. (4)

3. Winnipeg Free Press, July 23, 1965

4. August 7, 1965

But perhaps the acid test of the English-speaking Canadian response is to be found in the newspaper whose ancestor, at the time of Confederation, stood for the most virulent 'anti-French' section of English-speaking opinion. Today the Toronto Globe and Mail has serious reservations about the extent to which the federal-provincial conference machinery has moved a good deal of the nation's decision-making process from parliament and placed it behind 'closed doors'. The newspaper has reacted sharply to what it considers to be invalid Quebec claims to jurisdiction in external affairs, to what it believes to be injudicious demands to establish a provincial jurisdiction in the field of banking, and to other specific goals of the Quiet Revolution. Yet it accepts what many other English-speaking journals reject, the argument of Quebec spokesmen such as M. Claude Ryan, that the constitution should be re-drawn (although with M. Lesage's caution against haste in mind). What makes the Globe and mail representative of informed English speaking opinion, however, is its constant emphasis on the political as opposed to the theoretical method. Perhaps its blunt statements of the limits of readjustment (statements which are in themselves a response to Quebec requests for clarification of the English-speaking position) illustrate best the non-ideological yet definite concept of conciliation that is the essential response of contemporary English-speaking Canadian nationalism. In an editorial which rather unkindly criticized the present Royal Commission for contemplating the production of a second interim report, the Globe argued that further hearings and preliminary reports would do more harm than good:

Let the silence fall, and let the commissioners forget about any more interim reports and get on with the final report.

Even that report may be of little value when it comes, a mere documentation of Canada that once was and has ceased to be. For events in many areas are overtaking the commissioners, as they overtook the executive secretary who had to admit that a few months had markedly changed the climate in the Eastern Townships. The whole country is changing, and the pace of change could accelerate with dramatic suddenness when Parliament convenes and the new voice from Quebec is heard from the Quebec New Guard.

A strong Quebec representation in Ottawa, a new companionship between Quebec and Ontario, an awakened understanding throughout the country, a drawing together of all Canadians who recognize that independence is threatened more by the economic dominance to the south than by internal schism - all these could work quite a change in the patient. He is certain to be still suffering, but not necessarily from the same ailments or to the same degree as he was when his sickness was diagnosed. The Bi and Bi doctor may find that his horse and buggy wasn't fast enough. (5)

It is suitable, if not entirely tactful, to end the essay on this somewhat strident note. For, strident or not, it is the essential note of change and of reliance on that political pragmatism which has been the hallmark of English-speaking Canadian culture both in its regional and national phases.

